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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 2014 case of Harris v. Quinn,1 five members of the U.S. Su-
preme Court issued an opinion which strongly implied, albeit in dicta,
that a contract provision governing employment relations that two
private parties voluntarily agreed to implicated state action sufficient
to trigger constitutional rights. Were that not remarkable enough, the
five justices who signed onto this opinion—Justice Alito, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas—
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1. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
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were those normally identified as the Court’s conservatives. Specifi-
cally, they seemed open to the idea that the First Amendment could
apply to “union security” clauses in contracts negotiated by a union
and an employer in the private sector. A union security clause is a
provision in a union contract that requires employees in a union bar-
gaining unit to pay at least some portion of normal dues to the union
that represents them. Prior to Harris, one old Supreme Court case had
found state action in such clauses,2 and another old case had used the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance in interpreting the relevant stat-
ute, indicating a concern that state action might be present.3 But,
more recent cases on the topic have dodged constitutional issues.4
Thus, Harris seemed to revive an extraordinarily broad theory of
state action. Union security clauses in the private sector are negoti-
ated between two entirely private entities, typically a union and a cor-
poration. While the two private-sector labor law statutes—the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), governing most private employ-
ment,5 and the Railway Labor Act (RLA), governing the railroad and
airline industries6—permit (and limit) such clauses, neither statute
requires them, nor does either reward parties for adopting them. Fur-
ther, such clauses would be entirely legal without the NLRA and RLA,
and indeed, they existed prior to these statutes.7
This Article argues that the suggestion that private-sector union
security clauses implicate the Constitution involves unconvincing and
incoherent understandings of “state action” that the Court should ex-
plicitly reject. Harris indicated that a majority of the Supreme Court
was willing to entertain a theory that would not only make all union
security clauses in the private sector unconstitutional, but also would
go well beyond the Court’s broadest reading of state action in Shelley
v. Kraemer.8 Shelley found state action in private, racially restrictive
covenants, but subsequent cases have left that precedent at best lim-
ited to its facts. While liberals pushed for this broad approach decades
ago in an attempt to fight race discrimination by private parties before
the era of antidiscrimination statutes, conservatives pushed for an
analogous approach to state action specifically to attack unions as a
form of government-forced association.9 But in more recent decades,
courts have hewed to a narrower view of state action. While the death
of Justice Scalia prevented further exploration of this issue in an even
2. Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
3. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
4. See, for example, Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), dis-
cussed infra.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012).
6. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88 (2012).
7. See infra section II.A.
8. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
9. See infra section II.F.
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more recent case involving union security clauses,10 Harris showed
that four current justices are willing to revive and greatly expand
older visions. With President Donald Trump now having appointed a
conservative justice to fill the vacancy left by Justice Scalia’s death,
this issue may soon resurface. The law in such an important area
should not be left unclear; instead, courts should clearly reject the ar-
gument that private-sector union security clauses implicate state
action.
Harris arose as a case about union security clauses in the public
sector.11 It has been long settled that state action exists in public-sec-
tor labor and employment relations because the state is the em-
ployer.12 The seminal case on public-sector union security clauses,
10. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
This 4–4 memorandum decision, without any opinions, effectively upheld the
lower court decision in this case and, thus, did not change the law. Prior to Jus-
tice Scalia’s death, there had been considerable speculation that he would have
been the fifth vote to hold that union security clauses, at least in the public sec-
tor, violated the Constitution. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Victory for Unions as Su-
preme Court, Scalia Gone, Ties 4–4, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2016, at A1, http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/us/politics/friedrichs-v-california-teachers-associa-
tion-union-fees-supreme-court-ruling.html?_r=0 [https://perma.unl.edu/V5BC-
LQ2P].
11. Harris was widely seen as an opportunity for the Supreme Court to limit or even
bar the use of union security clauses in the public sector. Harris could have, and
almost did, overturn Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Abood had held that that union security clauses in the public sector did not vio-
late the First Amendment as long as they permitted members of union bargain-
ing units to object to and “opt out of” paying that portion of their dues that went
to activities unrelated to collective bargaining. Alternatively, Harris realistically
could have adopted the dicta in Knox v. Service Employees International Union,
Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298 (2012) (suggesting that the First Amendment might not
allow an “opt out” system but, at most, could allow an “opt in” system for paying
for such activities). Instead, while the five-member majority in Harris spent con-
siderable time criticizing Abood and union security clauses in general, Harris
was decided on relatively narrow grounds: the workers involved, home health-
care aides, were, the majority held, merely “quasi-public” employees and not “em-
ployees” under the state public-sector labor statute. Thus, while the plaintiffs
prevailed in Harris, the general rule of Abood remained intact for public employ-
ees generally; the holding in Harris was limited to the specific types of workers
involved in that case.
12. The Supreme Court has held since the 1960s that certain restrictions on public
employees by public employers are “unconstitutional conditions” of employment.
See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (holding
that drug-testing public employees without individualized suspicion implicates,
and in some cases violates, the Fourth Amendment); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that firing a public school teacher for writing a letter
to a newspaper criticizing the school board’s handling of a revenue measure and
its allocation of funds violated the First Amendment); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385
U.S. 493 (1967) (holding that threatening to fire public employees if they invoked
their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination violated employees’ Fifth
Amendment rights); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (holding
that a regulation which required public college teachers to certify that they were
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Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,13 established that the First
Amendment applied to these provisions. But Harris’s suggestion that
such clauses in the private sector implicate the First Amendment is
striking. Harris did not explain how state action, a requirement for
First Amendment violations,14 could exist in private-sector union con-
tracts. Nor did the older cases Harris cited, Railway Employees’ De-
partment v. Hanson15 and International Ass’n of Machinists v.
Street,16 give any plausible explanation of how such contracts involved
state action, although Hanson found such state action, and Street as-
serted that a real constitutional issue existed and thus required use of
the canon of constitutional avoidance.
Still, the Harris majority discussed private-sector labor law for
several pages and suggested that a constitutional problem existed
there.17 First, Harris criticized Hanson, a 1956 case which held that
union security clauses under the RLA implicated the First Amend-
ment, for not actually finding a First Amendment violation. Harris
asserted that Hanson’s failure to find a constitutional violation was
inconsistent with other First Amendment doctrine.18 The Harris ma-
jority stated that, in Hanson, “all that was held” was that the private-
sector labor statute “was constitutional in its bare authorization” of
union security agreements and nothing further.19 The Harris majority
also stressed that Street, another early RLA case, while decided on
statutory grounds, “recognized that the case presented constitutional
questions ‘of the utmost gravity.’”20 Further, the Harris majority
quoted portions of Justice Black’s dissent in Street, which argued that
the union security clause in Street did violate the First Amendment.21
While this was all dicta in Harris, it was striking, not just because it
was entirely unnecessary to Harris’s holding, but also because it was
exhuming and apparently endorsing an old, extremely broad, and
highly questionable approach to state action.
not Communists and report whether they ever had been Communists violated the
First Amendment). For the constitutional rights of public employees in their em-
ployment generally, see MARTIN MALIN, ANN HODGES, JOSEPH SLATER & JEFFREY
HIRSCH, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 61–176 (3d ed. 2016).
13. 431 U.S. 209.
14. The state action requirement for all alleged constitutional violations, except the
Thirteenth Amendment, was originally articulated in United States v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), and The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
15. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
16. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
17. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2627–30 (2014).
18. Id. at 2629 (calling the reasoning in Justice Douglas’s majority opinion in Hanson
“remarkable” and inconsistent with later opinions by Justice Douglas).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2630 (quoting Street, 367 U.S. at 749).
21. Id.
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This Article makes two basic points. First, union security clauses
in the private sector do not implicate the First Amendment because
there is no state action. The Article first describes union security
clauses and examines the general principles and theories the Supreme
Court has used to determine whether state action exists. It concludes
that, under rules that have been well established in modern law, these
clauses do not involve state action. While it may have been possible to
construct a nonfrivolous argument for state action by extending a few
theories from cases from the mid-twentieth century,22 under consis-
tent precedent dating back for several decades, private-sector union
agreements do not constitute state action.23
The Article then examines other possible theories supporting state
action: the Hanson opinion, arguments made by plaintiffs in private-
sector cases urging that state action exists, and the analogy to
mandatory state bar dues. It concludes that Hanson, the one case that
actually found state action in private-sector union security clauses, is,
on this point, thinly and poorly reasoned. Hanson asserted that the
RLA involved state action essentially because, while the RLA does not
require union security clauses, it preempts state “right to work” laws
which would bar them.24 But federal preemption of state laws, regard-
ing voluntary provisions in employment or other private contracts,
does not create state action. Further, union security clauses predate
federal labor statutes and would exist without them. Under the de-
fault employment law rules that would govern in the absence of labor
laws, employers could legally require employees to pay dues to almost
any sort of organization as a condition of employment.
Next, the Article critiques the argument made by plaintiffs in
these cases that state action should be found in labor law’s “majority
exclusive representation” model—the principle in the NLRA and RLA
that, if a majority of employees in a bargaining unit properly select a
union to represent them, the selected union exclusively represents all
employees in the bargaining unit in matters of wages, hours, and
working conditions. But labor statutes do not mandate the formation
of unions25 nor do they require union security clauses or reward par-
ties for adopting them. If a union is formed, while both the NLRA and
22. See Symposium, Individual Rights in Industrial Self-Government—A “State Ac-
tion” Analysis, 63 NW. U. L. REV. 4 (1968).
23. See Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National Labor
Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court’s Opinion in Beck, 27
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 51, 111 (1990) (“There seems no serious question as to the
constitutionality of agency shop agreements under the NLRA. . . . [T]he Court’s
conception of state action has since narrowed so that this is no longer a real
possibility.”).
24. See infra section II.C.
25. They are only permitted if they are supported by a majority of a relevant group of
employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012).
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RLA require bargaining in good faith, neither requires the parties to
enter into any contracts at all, much less to agree on any specific
terms.26 Also, corporate and agency law authorizes collective bodies to
take actions that bind participants in the collective body, yet volun-
tary contracts entered into by such parties clearly do not trigger state
action.
The Article then looks at Keller v. State Bar of California,27 the
only case in the past several decades that has stated, albeit in some-
what confusing dicta, that private-sector union security clauses are
subject to the First Amendment. Keller involved mandatory dues to an
integrated state bar association.28 But a voluntary contract between
private parties that a statute permits is quite different than the gov-
ernment literally requiring payments to a certain group as a condition
of holding a state license.
The Article then explains that the broadest state action decisions
of fifty to seventy years ago are best understood in the context of liber-
als straining to combat private race discrimination in the era before
antidiscrimination statutes and conservatives simultaneously seeking
to promote right-to-work rules to cripple unions. Even still, Harris’s
suggestions go far beyond the broadest theories of state action courts
have ever generally accepted.
The Article then argues that adopting the suggestions in Harris
would have radical and undesirable consequences in labor law and be-
yond. Among other things, it would mean that all clauses in private-
sector contracts would involve state action: e.g., drug-testing provi-
sions in private-sector labor contracts would be subject to Fourth
Amendment scrutiny, something no case has even suggested. Further,
Hanson’s logic would expand state action well beyond even the
broadest reading of Shelley v. Kraemer.29 It would mean state action
would be present where law merely permits a private collective insti-
tution—unions, employers, and others—to make contracts that bind
participants in such institutions. Such an interpretation is especially
surprising coming from conservatives—although, perhaps not in a
case involving labor unions.
The Article concludes that courts should squarely reject the sug-
gestion that union security clauses in the private sector implicate the
First Amendment. It describes a theory of state action consistent with
this result and existing precedent. In sum, this Article argues that the
idea that union security clauses in the private sector constitute state
26. See infra section II.A.
27. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
28. Id. at 11–14.
29. See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The
Search for Governmental Responsibility (pts. 1 & 2), 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 665,
697–98, 700–07 (1997).
68 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:62
action is indefensible under any theory of state action that courts do or
should accept.
II. PRIVATE-SECTOR UNION SECURITY CLAUSES DO NOT
INVOLVE “STATE ACTION”
A. What Private-Sector Union Security Clauses Are and Are
Not
A union security clause is a part of a contract between an employer
and a union providing that members of a union bargaining unit are
required to pay a certain portion of union dues as a condition of em-
ployment. The traditional justification for such clauses is that, under
the “duty of fair representation” doctrine,30 unions have a legal duty
to represent all members of a union bargaining unit fairly, and such
representation has costs. While a union contract can bind employees
in a union bargaining unit who do not support the union, under the
majority exclusive representation model, only unions who enjoy ma-
jority support from the employees in the bargaining unit may enter
into such contracts.
Crucially, union security clauses only exist when a union and an
employer voluntarily agree to them. Neither the NLRA nor the RLA
require unions and employers to agree to union security clauses. In-
deed, neither statute requires the parties to enter into a labor contract
at all. Section 8(d) of the NLRA states that while the unions and em-
ployers have a duty to “meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith . . . [,] such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.”31 Moreover, it is set-
tled law that an employer’s refusal to agree to a union security provi-
sion does not violate the duty to bargain in good faith or any other
part of the NLRA.32 Further, no part of the NLRA or RLA rewards the
parties for agreeing to union security clauses or punishes them for not.
Indeed, these statutes, and case law interpreting them, limit what
types of union security clauses the parties can agree to by making
some types of such clauses illegal.33 Also, the NLRA permits individ-
ual states to choose the so-called right-to-work rule, meaning that any
type of union security clause is illegal and unenforceable in that
30. See infra section II.D.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
32. See, e.g., Erie Brush & Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 700 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 2012); NLRB
v. Advanced Bus. Forms Corp., 474 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1973).
33. The rules governing such clauses are mainly, but not exclusively, in National
Labor Relations Act section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), and cases interpreting
it, such as Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
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state.34 Approximately half the states in the United States have exer-
cised that option.35
Notably, union security clauses existed in the private sector before
the NLRA or RLA regulated them and often went beyond what those
statutes currently permit. Prior to the RLA and the NLRA, unions
sought, and employers sometimes agreed to, “closed shop” agree-
ments—which required employers to hire only workers who were al-
ready union members—and “union shop” agreements—which
required employees to join the union after being hired.36 Current RLA
and NLRA law are actually more restrictive in that neither Act per-
mits either the closed or union shop agreements. The most that is per-
mitted under either statute after Street and Beck is the “agency shop,”
under which objecting members of union bargaining units cannot be
compelled to pay dues that go to activities related to collective
bargaining.37
Finally, union security clauses, like all clauses in union contracts,
apply only to the specific employers and unions who are parties to the
contract. They do not extend to entire professions or industries.
B. Basic State Action Doctrine
The basic requirement that the Constitution limit the acts of the
state but not acts of private parties, with the exception of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, was established in the nineteenth century.38
Traditional theories of state action generally do not seem applicable to
private-sector union security clauses. Of the many forms that claims
of state action have taken over the years, exhaustively identified and
34. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2012).
35. SETH D. HARRIS, JOSEPH E. SLATER, ANNE MARIE LOFASO & CHARLOTTE GARDEN,
MODERN LABOR LAW IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS: CASES AND MATERIALS
1142 (2d ed. 2016).
36. R. EMMETT MURRAY, THE LEXICON OF LABOR 39–40, 180 (1998) (noting that the
earliest recorded closed shop agreement in the United States was from 1799);
Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 81–84. Around the turn of the twentieth century,
when asked to rule on their legality, courts were split. For a case explicitly hold-
ing the closed shop legal before the RLA or NLRA, see National Protective Ass’n
of Steam Fitters v. Cumming, 63 N.E. 369 (N.Y. 1902). See generally DANIEL R.
ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE LIBER-
ALISM 92–95 (1995). But as Dau-Schmidt explains, “Once courts accepted that
unions were not unlawful conspiracies, most jurisdictions held that union secur-
ity agreements, including the closed, union, and agency shop, were lawful.” Dau-
Schmidt, supra note 23, at 82 & n.194 (collecting cases). Also, there is no question
that today, in the absence of the RLA and NLRA, it would be legal under modern
corporate and default “at will” employment law for employers to require employ-
ees to join various organizations as a condition of employment.
37. Nor can a union security clause require an employee to literally join the union,
although it still may require dues payments. NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373
U.S. 734 (1963). See generally HARRIS ET AL., supra note 35, at 1147–83.
38. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 29, at 340–44.
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documented by Professor G. Sidney Buchanan, only two are arguably
relevant to union security clauses.39 The first is what Professor
Buchanan calls the “State Nexus Issue.” This includes pervasive gov-
ernment involvement through activites such as licensing.40 As shown
below, though, the licensing cases require significantly more state in-
volvement than is present in private-sector union contracts. The sec-
ond is the “state authorization” of certain conduct.41 The question
regarding state authorization is when, if ever, a law that simply per-
mits a party to act in a certain way constitutes state action. While
Buchanan labels this “the most conceptually intriguing” of his catego-
ries,42 he also shows that little currently remains of this approach be-
cause of its potentially extremely broad sweep.43 What does remain
could not plausibly cover private-sector union contracts.
Beyond these categories, as Professor Terri Peretti explains, the
concept of state action expanded somewhat from the 1940s through
the 1970s but contracted in the decades after that.44 Relevant here,
Professor Peretti also notes that, while there is no explicit doctrinal
rule to this effect, the Supreme Court is less likely to find state action
in cases that do not involve race discrimination.45 Section II.F, infra,
discusses further the significance of race in state action theory gener-
39. Professor Buchanan identified a total of six types of state action cases, four of
which clearly do not apply to private-sector union security clauses. First,
Buchanan identifies the delegation of a traditional government function, such as
operating a political primary. If the function is “predominantly, even uniquely
governmental in nature,” then a private actor’s actions in performing the function
may constitute state action. Id. at 345. Negotiating a labor contract is not tradi-
tionally or mainly a government function. The second type of state action case
consists of those involving the “Beyond-State-Authority” situation, in which an
admittedly governmental actor exceeds his or her actual authority. Id. at 348.
Third, Buchanan identifies the “Projection-of-State-Authority Issue,” where a pri-
vate actor with no actual authority from the state pretends to be a state actor
(e.g., falsely claiming to be a police officer). Id. at 350. Buchanan labels the
fourth category as the “State Inaction Issue.” For example, what if a state agency
bars child abuse, is warned of a likely risk of child abuse, and does nothing when
steps could be easily taken? Id. at 352. For the last three, obviously neither em-
ployers nor unions in the private sector are, or purport to be, governmental
actors.
40. Id. at 346–47.
41. Id. at 351–52.
42. Id. at 352.
43. Id. at 709; see infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
44. Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 35 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 273, 273–74 (2010).
45. Id. at 276. Famous cases involving state action and race discrimination include,
but are not limited to, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and the infamous
“white primary” cases, in which the Supreme Court rejected attempts by South-
ern states to exclude black voters from Democratic primaries. Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); see also Peretti,
supra note 44, at 276 (discussing the “white primary” cases).
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ally and as applied to unions. For now, obviously, modern union secur-
ity clauses do not involve race discrimination.
Returning to Professor Buchanan’s categories, first, the State
Nexus or significant state involvement category is not nearly broad
enough to cover anything analogous to the exclusive-representation
and voluntary-contract-making model of the NLRA. For example, in
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,46 the Supreme Court held that a
private utility that was both licensed as a monopoly and heavily regu-
lated by the state was nonetheless not a government actor since utility
service was not an action traditionally “associated with sovereignty,”
as opposed to, say, eminent domain.47 Creating a process for negotiat-
ing labor contracts is certainly not an action traditionally associated
with sovereignty.48 Even fairly extensive regulation by the state does
not make the actions of an otherwise private party state action. Blum
v. Yaretsky49 found no state action by a private nursing home even
though it was “extensively regulated” through the Medicaid pro-
gram.50 The union contract-making process is not “extensively regu-
lated,” as the duty to bargain in good faith leaves contract terms to the
decisions and desires of private parties.
Nor is state action created merely because a government grants an
organization certain rights and privileges the organization would not
have absent the government grant. For example, in San Francisco
Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee,51 the Supreme
Court did not find that the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) was a
state actor even though Congress chartered the USOC, gave it author-
ity to seek Commerce Department grants, and gave it the exclusive
right to use the term “Olympic” and Olympic emblems. Among other
things, the Court explained that the “USOC’s choice of how to enforce
its exclusive right to use the word ‘Olympic’ simply is not a govern-
mental decision.”52 Similarly, granting exclusive representation
rights to a private-sector union is not sufficient to make it a govern-
ment actor, and the decisions of private employers and unions as to
what types of contract terms to adopt are not governmental decisions.
46. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
47. Id. at 353; see also Peretti, supra note 44, at 277 (discussing Jackson as an exam-
ple of the Court’s unwillingness to extend the category of state action cases in-
volving significant state involvement).
48. Indeed, collective bargaining in government employment came significantly later
in the public sector in the United States than it did in the private sector. See
JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW,
AND THE STATE, 1900–1962, at 1–2 (2004).
49. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
50. Id. at 1004, 1011.
51. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
52. Id. at 547.
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Nor is state action more likely to be found where a body receives
some significant government support and has the ability to discharge
an employee. In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,53 the Supreme Court found no
state action when a private school fired some of its employees even
though the school’s operating budget came almost entirely (ninety per-
cent) from public funds; the school was subject to extensive govern-
mental regulation; it was performing a traditional “public function”;
and the school had what the court called a “symbiotic relationship”
with the government (in part because nearly all of the school’s stu-
dents came via referrals from the state).54 In sum, private-sector
union security clauses are not state action under the State Nexus
approach.
Second, Buchanan explains that his state authorization model is
quite narrow and may not even exist in any significant way today be-
cause of its potentially overbroad scope.55 That is, finding state action
in a government statute that merely permits or authorizes behavior
by X that harms Y would make most actions, and resulting harms, by
private parties state action. It certainly would make all contracts be-
tween private parties state action. Such an approach is simply not
consistent with current law. Regarding contracts between private par-
ties, Flagg Bros. v. Brooks56 is instructive. In that case, the Supreme
Court found that a private creditor selling a woman’s property stored
at its warehouse after she was evicted for failure to pay her storage
fees did not constitute state action.57 This was true even though a
state actor, a sheriff, had arranged for this storage after her eviction.
As Buchanan notes, Flagg Bros. could have found state action using
the state authorization model, but the opinion did not even mention
it.58
Buchanan cites two cases which used this model in a “somewhat
subdued form”: Georgia v. McCollum59 and Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.60 Both involve facts quite different from union security
clauses and private-sector contracts in general. These cases held, re-
spectively, that a criminal defendant’s and a civil litigant’s intentional
race discrimination in using peremptory challenges is unconstitu-
tional.61 Barring intentional racial animus in juries, which can only be
created in official government fora (courts) and which perform
quintessentially traditional public functions, is worlds away from per-
53. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
54. Id. at 840–43.
55. Buchanan, supra note 29, at 709.
56. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
57. Id. at 159–66.
58. Buchanan, supra note 29, at 360–62.
59. 505 U.S. 42, 53–55 (1992).
60. 500 U.S. 614, 621–28 (1991).
61. Buchanan, supra note 29, at 362 & n.168.
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mitting but not requiring certain types of contract terms in private
employment. Among other things, the Edmonson opinion relied on the
fact that the injury occurs “within the courthouse itself.”62 Buchanan
notes the importance to the Court of the harm taking place in an “offi-
cial forum.”63 It is also worth noting the presence of race discrimina-
tion in these cases.
More generally, Edmonson set out three factors to examine in de-
termining whether state action is present in Buchanan’s state author-
ization model: “the extent to which the actor relies on governmental
assistance and benefits; whether the actor is performing a traditional
governmental function; and whether the injury is aggravated in a
unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.”64
Union security clauses in the private sector do not come close to
constituting state action under this test. As to relying on government
assistance, while labor law authorizes the exclusive-representation
model and permits unions to negotiate a specific type of union security
clause (while barring other types), again, the law neither requires nor
rewards such clauses. Also, private-sector unions and employers are
not funded in any direct or significant way by the government.
Moreover, neither the NLRA nor the RLA makes possible a con-
tract that would be illegal in the absence of these statutes. Under
state contract law and standard U.S. employment law, it would clearly
be legal for a private employer to require, as a condition of employ-
ment, that its employees sign contracts obligating them to pay dues to
a union. Indeed, absent a statute to the contrary, under common-law
“employment at will” rules, a private employer could legally require,
as a condition of employment, all its employees to join practically any
organization, from a local zoo to the Republican or Democratic Par-
ties.65 In some cases, such acts might violate statutory rules. But the
fact that, for example, some states have passed statutes barring pri-
vate-sector employers from discriminating on the basis of political af-
filiation66 shows that policymakers and advocates do not believe the
Constitution already barred such discrimination.
As to the second factor, again, union contract negotiations are not a
“traditional government function.” Contrast Edmonson, where the
Court explained that, while “the motive of a peremptory challenge
62. 500 U.S. at 628.
63. Buchanan, supra note 29, at 730 (quoting Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628).
64. 500 U.S. at 621–22 (citations omitted).
65. Evidence exists that such threats and practices are growing. See Alexander Her-
tel-Fernandez, Employer Political Coercion: A Growing Threat, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT, Nov. 23, 2015, http://prospect.org/article/employer-political-coercion-
growing-threat [https://perma.unl.edu/B7RY-BVMD].
66. For a discussion of such statutes, see Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech
and Political Activity: Statutory Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 295 (2012).
74 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:62
may be to protect a private interest, the objective of jury selection pro-
ceedings is to determine representation on a governmental body.”67 A
jury is “a quintessential governmental body having no attributes of a
private actor.”68 A union is nothing of the kind.
As to the third factor, whatever injuries private-sector union secur-
ity clauses arguably cause, they are not “aggravated in a unique way
by the incidents of government authority.” Union contracts are not
made in a courtroom or other official government forum. The govern-
ment does not control or participate in private-sector union bargaining
on substantive issues. Again, labor law merely requires a “duty to bar-
gain in good faith,” and it neither requires union security clauses nor
rewards parties for agreeing or not agreeing to them. Contrast that
with Edmonson, where the Court stressed that “[w]ithout the direct
and indispensable participation of the judge, who beyond all question
is a state actor, the peremptory challenge system would serve no
purpose.”69
Buchanan notes how limited the state authorization model is: cer-
tain activities “may not fairly be described as a public function.”70
These include “the wide range of private activities that the legal sys-
tem permits to occur but with respect to which government participa-
tion does not extend significantly beyond the ‘mere’ act of
permission.”71 Buchanan gives various examples of such activities, in-
cluding “the making of contracts” and “engaging in business.”72 The
Supreme Court has explained that even governmental “approval of or
acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to
justify holding the State responsible for those initiatives.”73 Also, as
Jackson held, the fact that a law authorizes a private party to employ
a practice if the party so desires does not make the “exercise of the
choice allowed by state law” into action of the state “where the initia-
tive comes from the [private party] and not from the state.”74 San
Francisco Arts & Athletics added that even government “approval” of
such choices is not sufficient to create state action.75 Given this defini-
tion, it is difficult to see how private-sector union contracts could be
considered state action.
Beyond this, a pure state authorization theory, in which state ac-
tion is created if a statute simply permitted the defendant to take ac-
tions that arguably harmed the plaintiff, at its high-water mark, led
67. 500 U.S. at 626.
68. Id. at 624.
69. Id.; see Buchanan, supra note 29, at 758.
70. Buchanan, supra note 29, at 762.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004–05 (1982).
74. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974).
75. S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 548 (1987).
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to the famous (or perhaps infamous) case of Shelley v. Kraemer.76
Shelley held that using courts to enforce a system of private racial
covenants implicated state action.77 In recent decades, though, Shel-
ley at most survives as strictly limited to its facts, and courts have not
adopted its general theoretical approach. Buchanan explains that Ev-
ans v. Abney78 “tightly confined Shelley to its most narrow application.
From that contraction, the state authorization model has never really
recovered.”79 This is, at least partly, because of the potentially ex-
traordinarily broad sweep of this theory. As Buchanan explains,
“every action engaged in by a private person is either compelled, pro-
hibited, or permitted, i.e., authorized, by the legal system.”80 State
acts of permission, potentially enforceable in court, routinely author-
ize private parties to affect the interests of others.81 The “comprehen-
sive scope” of this reality being sufficient to create state action
implicating the Constitution was likely too much for the Court.82
Thus, in subsequent cases in more recent decades, the Court repeat-
edly refused to use state authorization analysis.83
NCAA v. Tarkanian84 generally indicates the high bar for finding
state action under modern doctrine. In this case, a public university,
the University of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV), took disciplinary action
against its basketball coach, Jerry Tarkanian, pursuant to the recom-
mendations of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).85
The Court found no state action even though UNLV, a public univer-
sity and thus clearly itself a state actor, suspended Tarkanian, a pub-
lic employee, on the grounds that the suspension was required by the
rules and rulings of the NCAA. Furthermore, the Court held, the
NCAA was a private body—even though the NCAA itself had a signifi-
cant number of public schools in its membership.86
76. 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see also Buchanan, supra note 29, at 704–707 (discussing the
implications of Shelley on state action cases).
77. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20–21.
78. 396 U.S. 435 (1970). This case also involved a racial restriction in land use. See
Buchanan, supra note 29, at 716–18.
79. Buchanan, supra note 29, at 709. Buchanan titles a section of his detailed discus-
sion of this topic as: “The 1970s and 1980s: State Authorization in the Doldrums.”
Id. at 723.
80. Id. at 724.
81. Id. at 724–25; see also Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 130 (“[A]lmost every law
involves some grant of authority to a private party which affects the individual
freedom of the party or the people with whom it deals.”).
82. Buchanan, supra note 29, at 725.
83. Id.
84. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
85. Id. at 180–82.
86. Id. at 192–93, 196.
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An even more recent case, Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secon-
dary School Athletic Ass’n,87 put it this way: “[S]tate action may be
found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between State and
the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself.’ ”88 Union security clauses in the
private sector—which, again, labor statutes do not require but are in-
stead products of negotiations between two private parties and which
would be entirely legal in the absence of labor statutes—cannot fairly
be viewed as actions “of the State itself.”89
Even where a statute creates a framework under which an act can
be taken, no state action exists unless the party responsible for the
action is a state actor. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,90 the Court set
out a two-part test for determining when acts allegedly causing the
deprivation of a right are attributable to the government: “First, the
deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State . . . . Second, the party charged with the depriva-
tion must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.”91
While unions and business entities negotiate pursuant to rights cre-
ated by labor law and the law of business associations, in the private
sector, neither party is plausibly a state actor. As the Supreme Court
noted in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, “[a]ll corporations act under
charters granted by a government, usually by a State. They do not
thereby lose their essentially private character.”92
Thus, private-sector union security agreements are not state action
under any currently existing conception of state action. It is revealing
that the leading studies of state action theories discussed above, by
Peretti and Buchanan, do not even mention union security clauses or
Hanson.93 Hanson, however, relies on a theory that Peretti and
Buchanan do not recognize. Further, plaintiffs in private-sector cases
also have made arguments as to why these clauses constitute state
action. These approaches to state action are addressed below.
87. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
88. Id. at 295 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
89. Id.
90. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
91. Id. at 937; see also Buchanan, supra note 29, at 416–18 (discussing Lugar and the
Court’s inception of the two-part test).
92. 483 U.S. 522, 543–44 (1987).
93. Neither Peretti, supra note 44, nor Buchanan, supra note 29, even mentions Han-
son. Other overviews of state action theory also fail to mention Hanson. See, e.g.,
Julie K. Brown, Note, Less Is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO.
L. REV. 561 (2008).
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C. Hanson’s Argument: Federal Preemption of State
Contract Law is State Action?
The only Supreme Court decision actually holding that private-sec-
tor union security clauses involve state action, Hanson, is thinly rea-
soned and unconvincing. Even Justice Alito in Harris noted that in
Hanson, “the First Amendment was barely mentioned.”94 Justice
Douglas’s opinion in Hanson asserted that the RLA involved state ac-
tion because it preempts states’ right-to-work laws—laws that bar any
form of union security clause. “If private rights are being invaded,”
Hanson asserted, “it is by force of an agreement made pursuant to
federal law which expressly declares that state law is superseded. In
other words, the federal statute is the source of the power and author-
ity by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed.”95 Thus, Hanson
concluded, the “enactment of the federal statute authorizing union
shop agreements is the governmental action on which the Constitu-
tion operates, though it takes a private agreement to invoke the fed-
eral sanction.”96 An agreement under the RLA “has, therefore, the
imprimatur of the federal law upon it and, by force of the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, could not be made illegal nor
vitiated by any provision of the laws of a State.”97
No subsequent case has attempted to flesh out or elaborate on this
curious theory. None of the Supreme Court cases involving union se-
curity agreements since 1956 have held that the First Amendment ap-
plied in the private sector. They either refused the invitation to rule
on the basis of the First Amendment and relied instead on statutory
interpretation, or simply ignored the First Amendment.98 No case,
even in dicta, has given any further meat to the bare-bones assertions
in Hanson.
Hanson’s logic on this issue is puzzling. As shown above, before the
RLA was enacted, under preexisting contract law, employees in union
bargaining units had no right to be free of union security clauses, but
unions and employers were not required or encouraged to impose
them. The same is true under the RLA. Then, as now, union security
clauses existed if, and only if, two private parties—a union and an
employer—freely agreed to them. The RLA merely shifted the rele-
94. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2627 (2014).
95. Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956) (citations omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 232 & n.2.
98. See Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33 (1988) (NLRA case on
union security clauses not mentioning the First Amendment); Commc’ns Workers
v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (NLRA case expressly not considering the constitu-
tional issue and deciding the case on statutory grounds); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (RLA case expressly refusing to decide the case on
constitutional grounds and, instead, deciding it via statutory interpretation, al-
beit as a matter of constitutional avoidance).
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vant contract law to a federal statute. It is true that the RLA, unlike
the NLRA, preempts state laws that ban union security clauses. But,
this preemption does not constitute requiring, or even significantly en-
couraging, union security clauses, and in no other context has state
action been found where a federal statute prevents a state from mak-
ing illegal a contract term which the parties to the contract may still
freely accept or reject.99
A theory under which state action is created merely by shifting the
regulation of private conduct involving voluntary action from state
law to federal law would have radical results, including upending
much labor and employment law. Federal law routinely preempts
state laws on labor and employment matters, including making vari-
ous contract terms illegal. Private-sector labor law alone provides
multiple examples. While the NLRA, unlike the RLA, allows states to
choose to bar union security agreements, that is the only provision of
the NLRA which states may modify. The NLRA bars, and preempts
state laws permitting, covered unions and employers from entering
into various types of contract provisions. For example, section
8(a)(3)100 of the NLRA bars closed shop agreements, union security
clauses in which the employer agrees to hire only union members; sec-
tion 8(b)(6)101 bars “featherbedding” clauses, contractual agreements
to pay employees for services that are not to be performed; and section
8(e)102 bars “hot cargo” provisions, contract clauses that give employ-
ees the right to refuse to handle “struck goods” from other employers.
Beyond this, the NLRA preempts any state law purporting to expand
or limit any rights under the NLRA.103 Yet, aside from Hanson, no
case has suggested that NLRA preemption of state law in these con-
texts creates state action implicating the Constitution.104
Federal employment laws, laws governing the relations of individ-
ual employees and their employers outside the union context, also pre-
empt state employment laws in a variety of ways. Some set “floors”
99. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 139.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012).
101. § 158(b)(6).
102. § 158(e).
103. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236 (1959) (holding that activities barred by National Labor Relations Act
section 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158, may not be permitted or regulated by the states).
104. In several cases involving various contexts, the Supreme Court has found that
the NLRA preempts state laws in the same area, but aside from Hanson, the
Court has never indicated that this preemption created state action. See, e.g.,
Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008) (holding that the NLRA
preempts a state law barring employers that receive state funds from using the
funds to assist or deter union organizing); Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machists v.
Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (holding that a state law used
to challenge a concerted refusal to work overtime by employees was covered by
the NLRA).
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and preempt state laws that would purport to legalize contracts be-
tween employers and employees below the floor. For example, a state
law could not make legal an employment contract term that provides
for pay less than the minimum wage the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) sets for parties the FLSA covers. A state law could not make
legal employment contracts that permit discrimination Title VII pro-
hibits. No case has suggested that because federal employment laws
make certain specific contract terms illegal in employment, voluntary,
nonmandated contract terms in private employment that avoid such
illegal terms, or that include terms that the federal law permits but
does not require, are a product of state action.105
It is hard to defend the theory that a contract entered into by two
private parties somehow morphs into state action merely because the
underlying contract law, which permits but does not require certain
contract terms, is changed from state contract law to federal law. It
would arguably be different if the law required a specific contract
term, but that is not the case here. It is an especially odd argument
here in that the “preemption” Hanson discussed actually allows more
discretion to private parties: the RLA makes it illegal for states to pre-
vent private parties from agreeing to union security clauses. As Pro-
fessor Dau-Schmidt observes, it “seems curious that a decision not to
regulate an area of private activity gives rise to a finding of state
action.”106
Finally, the “preemption” theory in Hanson, even if valid, would
seem not to affect unions under the NLRA. Unlike the RLA, the NLRA
permits states to make union security clauses of any type illegal.107
Interestingly, the Harris majority, while musing broadly about the
private sector and citing Hanson, did not cite any authority specific to
the NLRA concerning union security clauses. Is the theory that the
RLA constitutes state action but the NLRA does not? If so, Harris did
not make that clear, and such a distinction is arguably inconsistent
with some of the broad dicta in Keller v. State Bar of California,108
discussed infra. At minimum this should be clarified, but since the
theory that federal preemption of laws barring certain contract terms
in private employment creates state action has no precedent outside
Hanson and would go well beyond existing law in the realm of state
action, this entire approach should be explicitly rejected.
105. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 129 (“Although the state has sometimes
passed laws regulating minimum wages, maximum hours, and working condi-
tions, . . . [t]raditionally, the determination of private terms of employment has
been left to the private parties.”).
106. Id. at 138.
107. See National Labor Relations Act § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2012) (the so-called
right-to-work clause).
108. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
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D. “Forced Association” Creating State Action?
While Hanson was the only Supreme Court case to find state ac-
tion in a union security clause, the Harris majority also cited approv-
ingly a dissent in Street which would have found a First Amendment
violation in that case. The Street majority, using the doctrine of consti-
tutional avoidance, relied on statutory interpretation to create the
rule—now used for the NLRA and RLA—that the most a union secur-
ity clause can require is that members of union bargaining units pay
that portion of their dues that go to activities “related to collective
bargaining.”109
But the Harris majority seemed to side with Justice Black’s dissent
in Street and specifically the argument that any sort of union security
clause under the RLA violated the First Amendment. Black centered
his approach on the “exclusive majority representative” model the
RLA and NLRA use. Under that model, if a majority of employees in
an appropriate union bargaining unit vote to authorize union repre-
sentation, that union represents all the employees in the bargaining
unit, including those employees who do not wish to be represented by
a union.110
The Harris majority summarized Black’s critique of the majority’s
approach in Street and seemed to endorse the idea that private-sector
union security clauses constitute some type of state action. The Harris
majority wrote:
That approach, [Justice Black] wrote, while “very lucrative to special masters,
accountants and lawyers,” would do little for “the individual workers whose
First Amendment freedoms have been flagrantly violated.” He concluded:
Unions composed of a voluntary membership, like all other volun-
tary groups, should be free in this country to fight in the public fo-
rum to advance their own causes, to promote their choice of
candidates and parties and to work for the doctrines or the laws
they favor. But to the extent that Government steps in to force peo-
ple to help espouse the particular causes of a group, that group—
whether composed of railroad workers or lawyers—loses its status
as a voluntary group.111
Even at the time of Street, however, other justices sharply dis-
agreed with this view. In a separate dissent in Street, Justice Frank-
furter, writing for himself and Justice Harlan, rebutted Justice
109. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) (establishing this ap-
proach for the RLA though an interpretation of the RLA); see also Commc’ns
Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (establishing the same for the NLRA
through an interpretation of the NLRA). In the public sector, Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), adopted the same rule but established it
as a matter of constitutional law.
110. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 35, at 343–50.
111. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2630 (2014) (quoting Street, 367 U.S. at 796
(Black, J., dissenting)).
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Black’s concerns on this point, explaining that even given a union se-
curity clause:
No one’s desire or power to speak his mind is checked or curbed. The individ-
ual member may express his views in any public or private forum as freely as
he could before the union collected his dues. . . . Congress has not commanded
that the railroads shall employ only those workers who are members of au-
thorized unions. Congress has only given leave to a bargaining representative,
democratically elected by a majority of workers, to enter into a particular con-
tractual provision arrived at under the give-and-take of duly safeguarded bar-
gaining procedures. . . . When we speak of the Government ‘acting’ in
permitting the union shop, the scope and force of what Congress has done
must be heeded. There is not a trace of compulsion involved . . . .112
While no other opinion in any other case on private-sector union
security clauses between Street and Harris directly argued that the
First Amendment applied and was violated, the issue remained some-
what muddled. A few cases suggested that such clauses might impli-
cate the Constitution, but without addressing the state action
question. For example, another RLA case, Ellis v. Brotherhood of Rail-
way, Airline & Steamship Clerks,113 began by citing the admonition in
Street that the Court should avoid deciding constitutional issues if the
statute could be construed to avoid constitutional difficulty.114 Ellis
then applied the rules and test from Street—which, again, were ar-
rived at through statutory interpretation—to a variety of union activi-
ties to determine if they were “related to collective bargaining” or not.
In so doing, Ellis referred to the First Amendment in a few places, e.g.,
“The First Amendment concerns with regard to publications and con-
ventions are more serious.”115 But Ellis did not even mention state
action, much less attempt to show how it could exist.
Plaintiffs in the leading case on union security clauses in the pri-
vate-sector, Communications Workers v. Beck,116 also relied on the ex-
clusive-representation model to urge the Court to find state action
sufficient to trigger the First Amendment.117 While Beck declined the
plaintiffs’ invitation to decide the case on constitutional grounds,118
those arguments deserve a response here. They have some superficial
appeal. First, the plaintiffs did not rely on Hanson’s reasoning.119
112. Street, 367 U.S. at 806–07.
113. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
114. Id. at 444.
115. Id. at 456.
116. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
117. Brief for the Respondents at 7–11, Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (No. 86-637).
118. In Beck, both the majority and dissenting opinions declined to reach, and indeed
did not even discuss, the alleged constitutional issue and instead relied on statu-
tory grounds. Beck, 487 U.S. at 761 (“We need not decide [the state action is-
sue].”); id. at 763 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
119. Of course, Hanson’s logic centering on the RLA’s preemption of state right-to-
work laws was inapplicable, as the NLRA, the statute Beck concerned, permits
states to choose right-to-work rules. But, even beyond that, plaintiffs seemed
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Rather, the plaintiffs argued that, but for the system of exclusive rep-
resentation labor law authorizes (unions bargained for exclusive rep-
resentation prior to the NLRA or RLA, but labor statutes make it the
sole model where unions are selected as representatives),120 their
union would not bargain on their behalf, and it is at least arguably
less likely that their employer would agree to a union security clause,
under which they could lose their jobs if they refuse to pay certain
dues to a union that they do not personally support. Whatever one
thinks of this argument as a policy matter, though, these factors sepa-
rately and together do not constitute state action.
More specifically, the plaintiffs in Beck argued that the labor con-
tract in question was “hardly ‘private,’ because CWA [the union in-
volved] is and must be a statutory Section 9(a) exclusive representative,
exercising special legal powers and privileges as against both the em-
ployer and the Employees.”121 While the plaintiffs granted that pri-
vate employers remain free to agree or not agree to a union security
clause, they stressed that if an employer did agree, they, as individual
employees, would be bound to such a clause as a condition of employ-
ment.122 Thus, the plaintiffs insisted that, under the NLRA’s exclu-
sive-representation model based in section 9(a) of the NLRA, all
employees “must accept as an inflexible condition of employment
CWA’s unilateral choices regarding 8(a)(3) [union security]-agree-
ments and all other subjects of bargaining. Thus, the coercion mate-
rial to ‘governmental-action’ analysis derives from CWA’s 9(a)
status.”123
While the plaintiffs relied on none of the standard cases on state
action discussed above, they did rely heavily on one Supreme Court
case from 1944, Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co.124 Steele, an RLA case,
did not involve union security clauses. Rather, it was one of the early
cases that helped create the doctrine of the union’s duty of fair repre-
sentation (DFR). The DFR is a court-created rule used under both the
NLRA and RLA. In short, while the duty is not in the text of either
statute, courts have inferred that unions have a duty to act with a
certain level of competence, fairness, and good faith when represent-
ing any and all members of their bargaining units, as a necessary co-
unimpressed with Hanson, stating: “Explication of Hanson’s shadowy verbiage is
not worthwhile.” Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at 11 n.42.
120. Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169,
197–98 (2015) [hereinafter Estlund, Unions] (discussing how unions bargained
for exclusive representation prior to the NLRA or RLA, but now labor statutes
make it the sole model where unions are selected as representatives).
121. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at 7.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 7–8.
124. 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at 9–10.
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rollary to the union’s right of exclusive representation.125 The
majority in Steele did not find state action or a constitutional viola-
tion, but rather asserted, with little explanation, that if the RLA did
not contain something like a DFR rule, racial discrimination by unions
could implicate state action. But, the majority then explained, the
RLA should be read to provide a DFR rule, so there was no constitu-
tional violation or need to further consider constitutional issues.126
In Beck, the plaintiffs relied not on the majority opinion in Steele
but, rather, on part of Justice Murphy’s concurring opinion in Steele.
Justice Murphy wrote:
The constitutional problem inherent in this instance is clear. Congress,
through the Railway Labor Act, has conferred upon the union selected by a
majority of a craft or class of railway workers the power to represent the en-
tire craft or class in all collective bargaining matters. While such a union is
essentially a private organization, its power to represent and bind all mem-
bers of a class or craft is derived solely from Congress.127
As shown above, though, all these arguments go far beyond all
other Supreme Court cases on what constitutes state action. Tellingly,
the only Supreme Court decision the plaintiffs in Beck relied on for the
state action issue was Steele—a case that is now over seventy years
old, is not even mentioned in leading discussions of state action,128
has not been followed by any modern case, and whose majority opinion
does not actually find state action.
The theory from Steele’s concurrence is essentially arguing the in-
defensible position that where state action merely permits private par-
ties to enter into contracts, such contracts constitute state action. It
adds an unconvincing twist: a claim that if state action sets up a type
of collective institution whose decisions can bind individuals who par-
ticipate in that collective institution, that alone constitutes state ac-
125. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 35, at 1102–40.
126. The Steele majority opinion explained:
If the Railway Labor Act purports to impose on petitioner and the other
Negro members of the craft the legal duty to comply with the terms of a
contract whereby the representative has discriminatorily restricted their
employment for the benefit and advantage of the Brotherhood’s own
members, we must decide the constitutional questions which petitioner
raises in his pleading.
But we think that Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor Act and
authorizing a labor union, chosen by a majority of a craft, to represent
the craft, did not intend to confer plenary power upon the union to sacri-
fice, for the benefit of its members, rights of the minority of the craft,
without imposing on it any duty to protect the minority.
323 U.S. at 198–99. Plaintiffs’ brief did not quote the second paragraph above, the
paragraph which makes it clear that the Court did not, in fact, find state action in
this case. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at 10.
127. Steele, 323 U.S. at 208; accord Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at 10
(quoting Steele, 323 U.S. at 208).
128. Neither Buchanan, supra note 29, nor Peretti, supra note 44, even mentions
Steele.
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tion. It should be stressed here that when Justice Murphy refers to
“the entire craft or class,” this does not mean all railroad workers or
all railroad workers of a certain type in the profession as a whole. It
means a discrete set of employees covered by a contract voluntarily
entered into by a specific railroad employer and the union represent-
ing the specific group of that particular railroad’s employees who have
authorized union representation.
The Steele concurrence would go far beyond current law. As dis-
cussed further below, it would not only make all parts of union collec-
tive bargaining agreements subject to the Constitution, it would do
the same for all contracts entered into by any kind of business associa-
tion or other collective group that provides binding obligations to
members of such association. Labor law grants certain rights and re-
sponsibilities to labor unions as collective entities, but this does not
create state action in the voluntary actions of the collective entity. Af-
ter all, as with unions, the rights, responsibilities, and levels of liabili-
ties of business associations are set by statutes, and there has been no
suggestion from the Beck plaintiffs or others that contract formation
by business associations, outside the union context, therefore consti-
tutes state action.
Further, while the NLRA does give “exclusive” or “monopoly”-type
power to unions to negotiate terms and conditions of employment—
where a majority of relevant employees have chosen a union, and for
those employees only—again, per Jackson, a government grant of mo-
nopoly powers to an otherwise private party does not make that party
into a state actor even if the government also heavily regulates that
party. Moreover, a union lacks the power of a true monopoly: the
NLRA gives unions the power to make contract proposals and requires
employers to bargain in good faith over them, but unions do not have
the power to unilaterally implement their proposals or to require the
employer to adopt any of their proposals.129 This is simply not state
action as the Supreme Court has defined it. As San Francisco Arts &
Athletics130 explained, quoting two other Supreme Court cases, “[A]
government ‘normally can be held responsible for a private decision
only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such signifi-
cant encouragement . . . that the choice must in law be deemed to be
that of the [government].’ ”131
It is worth underscoring here that not only do labor laws not re-
quire union security clauses, such laws contain no “significant encour-
129. In addition to the discussion of the duty to bargain, see Benjamin I. Sachs, Un-
ions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 800, 849 (2012).
130. S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
131. Id. at 586 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982)).
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agement” either. A black-letter “fundamental premise” of labor law is
“freedom of collective bargaining . . . ‘without any official compulsion
over the actual terms of the contract.’”132 Actual terms are set by the
(private) parties. Section 1 of the NLRA does speak of “encourag-
ing . . . collective bargaining,” but this refers entirely to the process,
not to any substantive result.133 As Professor Dau-Schmidt notes, the
government “encourages” a wide variety of economic activity—
through, e.g., the law of business associations, tax law, loans and
grants, and more—without any of the behavior by private parties
taken pursuant to such encouragement being considered state
action.134
In the end, Beck declined the plaintiffs’ invitation to hold that the
Constitution applied, and Beck did not rule, or even opine on, the issue
of state action. In so doing, however, the Beck majority provided two
citations that indicated that state action was not present. The Court
stated:
We need not decide whether the exercise of rights permitted, though not com-
pelled, by § 8(a)(3) involves state action. [Compare] Steelworkers v. Sadlowski
(union’s decision to adopt an internal rule governing its elections does not in-
volve state action) [and] Steelworkers v. Weber (negotiation of collective-bar-
gaining agreement’s affirmative-action plan does not involve state action).135
It is hard to imagine how a union security clause in a private-sec-
tor labor contract could implicate the Constitution if an affirmative-
action clause in a private-sector labor contract does not. While some
scholars have wondered if constitutional concerns were present im-
plicitly, as Beck relied on Street’s interpretation of similar statutory
language, and Street spoke of constitutional concerns,136 these cites
indicate otherwise. In any case, after Beck, the fate of private-sector
union security clauses seemed to have been resolved without any ref-
erence to the First Amendment.
The short response to Beck’s plaintiffs’ argument, therefore, is as
follows: there is no state action when governments grant monopoly
powers to institutions. Indeed, a private utility is arguably granted a
stronger monopoly than a union. For example, those the utility serves
have no vote on who runs the utility nor any direct vote on whether to
establish or disestablish the utility as members of union bargaining
132. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 254–55 (1974)
(quoting H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970)).
133. The “fundamental premise” on which the NLRA is based is “private bargaining
under government supervision of the procedure alone, without any official com-
pulsion over the actual terms of the contract.” H.K. Porter Co., 397 U.S. at 108.
134. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 137–83.
135. Commc’ns Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 761 (1988) (first citing Steelworkers v.
Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 121 n.16 (1982); and then citing Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979)).
136. See Sachs, supra note 129, at 816–17, 817 n.94.
86 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:62
units do with unions.137 There is no state action when a private party,
including a private party whose collective form is authorized by stat-
ute, is given the power to discharge an employee. Under long-existing
corporate and employment law, private companies may legally dis-
charge employees for joining or refusing to join any organization, or
for explicit political speech, without implicating the Constitution.
Even if labor statutes make the limited forms of union security clauses
they permit somewhat more common than such clauses would be
without labor statutes, the statutes do so solely by modestly increas-
ing the bargaining power of the union that a majority of relevant em-
ployees chose, not by requiring such clauses or rewarding parties for
voluntarily choosing them.138 This is not state action.
E. Keller, the First Amendment, and the State Bar
Comparison
The only other Supreme Court case suggesting that state action
exists in private-sector labor contracts is Keller v. State Bar of Califor-
nia,139 although Keller’s discussion of union issues is in somewhat
muddled dicta. Keller found a First Amendment right for attorneys to
object to a state bar using mandatory fees for ideological purposes. In
Keller, the state had created an “integrated bar” to govern the legal
profession, and lawyers were required to pay dues to this bar in order
to practice law in the state. Relevant here, Keller reasoned in part that
the state bar was not really a government agency but was analogous
to a labor union. But exactly how, and to what kind of union, was un-
clear. At one point Keller stated that the state bar was “subject to the
same constitutional rule with respect to the use of compulsory dues as
are labor unions representing public and private employees.”140 Con-
fusingly though, while Keller relied in part on Abood and other public-
sector labor cases141 which clearly involve state action, Keller also
137. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 128.
138. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 134, offers a counter to the suggestion that labor
law encourages union security clauses. Since such clauses can only be the result
of voluntary bargaining, he notes, they could be traded off for other benefits or
rights. Thus, whether a union security clause is included in a contract “will de-
pend on whether it is an ‘efficient’ contract term, in that its benefits to the em-
ployees outweigh its costs to the employer, and not on the respective bargaining
power of the parties.” Id. In other words, the greater bargaining power that labor
law provides to unions can result in workers receiving a greater share of an em-
ployer’s profits, but that bargaining power does not determine what specific
terms are most desirable to the union or employer or what will be included in a
contract.
139. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
140. Id. at 13.
141. E.g., id. at 10 (“[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the prop-
agation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.” (quoting Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 n.31 (1997))).
2017] A RADICAL THEORY OF STATE ACTION 87
cited Hanson and Ellis, while correctly noting that Ellis was “constru-
ing the RLA”142—as opposed to having been decided on constitutional
grounds. Also confusingly, Keller stated that “the principles of Abood
apply equally to employees in the private sector.”143 Did that merely
mean that the substantive rule (i.e., union security clauses cannot
compel dissenting employees to pay that portion of their union dues
not related to collective bargaining) is the same in the private sector
and public sector? If so, that is uncontroversially true: Beck and subse-
quent private-sector precedent, while decided on statutory grounds,
use the rule Abood and subsequent public-sector precedent found that
the First Amendment required. But did Keller mean that the source of
the rule was the same in the public and private sectors? If so, that
statement would be at least mostly false. Again, while the source of
the rule in the public sector is the Constitution, in the private sector,
under the RLA, only Hanson seems to have found state action, with
later cases avoiding constitutional issues, and no case under the
NLRA has found state action.144
Intriguingly, while the Harris majority briefly discussed Keller, it
did not use this case to bolster its suggestion that private-sector labor
relations may implicate state action. Rather, the Harris majority
merely argued that Keller was consistent with Harris’s refusal to ex-
tend Abood to cover the particular workers in the Harris litigation.145
Still, Keller stated, albeit in brief dicta, that private-sector unions are
covered by a “constitutional rule” with regard to mandatory dues, and
this is similar to the Harris majority’s suggestions.146
State bar associations, however, are quite different than unions,
distinguishable in several significant ways. First, in Keller, the gov-
ernment itself affirmatively required both membership in the state
bar and payment of mandatory dues to an organization as a condition
of practicing law.147 Under labor law, the state does not require an
employee to be a member of a union bargaining unit to practice in any
given profession. This is especially true as a practical matter in the
private sector, where total union density is now under seven per-
cent.148 Unions may only represent employees where a majority of rel-
evant employees support the union, and unions can be “voted out”
142. Id. at 14.
143. Id. at 10.
144. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 35, at 1153–82.
145. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014).
146. Keller, 496 U.S. at 14
147. Id. at 5.
148. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members—
2016 (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://per
ma.unl.edu/3YV2-XNW8] (stating that private-sector union density in 2016 was
6.4%).
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through decertification proceedings.149 Also, again, the government
neither requires union security clauses nor rewards parties for having
them. Further, the government has significant involvement in setting
substantive rules for attorneys practicing law, including, but not lim-
ited to, requiring a law license and setting requirements for how such
licenses may be obtained, whereas it has little to no involvement in
setting the terms of labor contracts.150 Beyond the explicit bars on a
handful of types of contract clauses in the NLRA and RLA, again, the
general principle in labor law is that the government, both agencies
and courts, should avoid as much as possible any input on the sub-
stantive terms of labor contracts.
In terms of comparing lawyers to unions, a more analogous case
would be Polk County v. Dodson,151 which held a public defender does
not act under the color of state law when representing criminal de-
fendants even though the state funded such criminal defenses.152 And
again, the government does not even fund unions.
In sum, the most that the NLRA and RLA do is authorize, when a
majority of a specific group of employees at a specific employer desire,
a collective institution to be the agent for a contract that is binding on
individual members of that group regarding their employment at that
employer. The government sets no terms of the contracts and requires
no payments from individuals as a condition of any particular job,
much less profession. Again, labor law is no different than corporate
and agency law, which authorizes entities composed of a group of peo-
ple to enter into contracts that bind individual members of that entity,
and which specifies who may negotiate and enter into such contracts.
No case has suggested that the mere fact that corporate law autho-
rizes corporate agents to enter into contracts, employment or other-
wise, that bind individual employees, managers, or owners of the
corporation creates state action. Yet, there have been undercurrents
in U.S. law that suggest that somehow unions are different.
149. For rules on certification and decertification, see PAUL M. SECUNDA, ANNE M.
LOFASO, JOSEPH E. SLATER & JEFFREY M. HIRSCH, MASTERING LABOR LAW 119–25
(2014).
150. As Professor Cynthia Estlund points out:
Lawyers have no individual or collective right to refrain from bar over-
sight; submission to regulation by the bar is mandatory for all lawyers,
and they do not get to choose among competing bar associations or to
form their own.  By contrast, . . . workers may choose among existing
unions, form their own union, or have none at all, based on majority rule
in particular workplaces.
Estlund, Unions, supra note 120, at 192.
151. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
152. Although Dodson reserved the right to distinguish between the concepts of “state
action” and “under the color of law,” the Court has never done so. Buchanan,
supra note 29, at 672.
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F. Unions as a Special Case and Race
In debates on this issue, one senses that for some, unions are sim-
ply a special case to which normal rules that apply to other private
organizations, especially businesses, do not apply.153 Corporate law
permits businesses to set a wide range of rules for those who partici-
pate in, or even interact with, the business without courts finding or
suggesting this creates state action. Relevant here, these include the
power of corporate management to set rules for employment in the
corporation such as conditions for discharge, and the discretion of cor-
porate managers to use corporate profits and income from sharehold-
ers for political purposes. Professor Benjamin Sachs has stressed that
there is no more state action in private-sector union security clauses
than in acts by private corporations in general. While the NLRA ar-
guably encourages unions and collective bargaining, corporate law
similarly encourages the formation and growth of corporations and
corporate investment.154 Both unions and corporations are associa-
tions that engage in both economic and political activity.155 In sum, “it
is difficult to justify a conclusion that state action defines the union
setting but not the corporate one.”156 Other scholars have come to
similar conclusions.157
To understand the otherwise puzzling argument that private-sec-
tor union security clauses involve state action, one must understand
the impact on the legal theory of the mid-twentieth century of the
sometimes connected, but sometimes oddly paralleled, opposition of
liberals to race discrimination and conservatives to unions. As noted
above, Professor Peretti shows that the Supreme Court was, at least
in the period before the 1970s, before modern antidiscrimination stat-
utes, most willing to expand state action doctrine in cases involving
race discrimination. It is the thread that connects Shelley to Steele.
153. Plaintiffs in Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), addressed
cases such as Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), and San
Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522
(1987), by stressing that they arose “outside the peculiar area of labor relations.”
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 117, at 15.
154. Sachs, supra note 129, at 846–47 (noting that corporate law grants legal person-
ality to corporations to have the same powers as individuals to do what is neces-
sary or convenient to carry out its business and grants them “perpetual life” so
that they can survive across changes in shareholders and management).
155. Id. at 853–54.
156. Id. at 848.
157. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Associa-
tion Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 100, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023 (2013); Char-
lotte Garden, Citizens United and the First Amendment of Labor Law, 43
STETSON L. REV. 571 (2014); Sachs, supra note 129 (all arguing, among other
things, that union-security-clause doctrine is inconsistent with analogous First
Amendment doctrine governing, e.g., corporations, after Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
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The desire to expand the limits of state action doctrine on the liberal
side came in large part from frustrations with the lack of legal tools to
combat private race discrimination in the era before antidiscrimina-
tion statutes. Meanwhile, some on the conservative side were eager to
use a similar broad view of state action specifically as a way to attack
unions. While modern state action theory has abandoned these ap-
proaches, the reality of five conservative Supreme Court justices in
Harris expressing sympathy to the old anti-union arguments cannot
be explained without understanding this history.
Sophia Lee’s excellent book, The Workplace Constitution,158 traces
the evolution of these ideas. Explicit race discrimination in employ-
ment was common before the Title VII era, and unionized employment
was no exception. The model of exclusive representation coupled with
earlier forms of union security agreements such as the closed shop cre-
ated serious problems for black workers, especially in cases where the
unions themselves discriminated on the basis of race.159 Not surpris-
ingly, in the years before the NLRA, black leaders were divided on
whether the labor movement posed a threat or an opportunity. Al-
though by the later New Deal many prominent black voices embraced
the latter view, the NLRA did not ban race discrimination, nor did any
other contemporary law bar race discrimination in private employ-
ment.160 Yet, race discrimination in employment, and society in gen-
eral, was increasingly perceived as a problem, an especially vexing one
for liberals in the decade leading up to Brown v. Board of
Education.161
It is in that time period and context that cases such as Steele and
Shelley arose: cases which, frankly, bent state action theory beyond
any bounds that were previously recognized or would be recognized
later, in an attempt to address the fundamental evil of racism in pri-
vate economic transactions before statutes barred such discrimina-
tion.162 Yet, while Shelley was a brief high-water mark for this
approach, even at the time, courts shied away from its broadest impli-
cations, leading to confusing decisions such as Steele. As Lee puts it,
“Whether the Constitution created unions’ duty [of fair representa-
tion], compelled the Court’s interpretation of the act, or merely hap-
158. SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW
RIGHT (Sarah Barrnger Gordon et al. eds., 2014). Also consider the insightful re-
view essay discussing this book in light of Harris, Cynthia Estlund, How the
Workplace Constitution Ties Liberals and Conservatives in Knots, The Workplace
Constitution From the New Deal to the New Right, by Sophia Z. Lee, 93 TEX. L.
REV. 1137 (2015) [hereinafter Estlund, Workplace Constitution], and further dis-
cussion in Estlund, Unions, supra note 120, at 179–84.
159. LEE, supra note 158, at 14–16.
160. Id. at 11–21.
161. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
162. LEE, supra note 158, at 11–34 (discussing Steele and related issues).
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pened to coincide with it, was unclear.”163 Thereafter, the DFR
doctrine that Steele helped create was refined in a series of NLRA and
RLA cases, several more of which involved, at least alleged, union dis-
crimination against black employees but which did not invoke the
Constitution.164
Liberal attempts to use a fairly all-encompassing theory of state
action to combat race discrimination in this period existed at various
levels. Frank Bloom, a chief trial examiner at the National Labor Re-
lations Board (NLRB),165 promoted the theory “that government’s
mere tolerance of discrimination constituted impermissible state ac-
tion.”166 This theory, which goes beyond even Shelley, which at least
required government active enforcement of private agreements that
discriminated, was never adopted.167 The NLRB then later invoked
the concept of state action in another way to try and combat race dis-
crimination. In 1946, the year before Taft–Hartley made the closed
shop illegal, the NLRB adopted a policy such that, if a union negoti-
ated a closed shop, it could not engage in racial discrimination in
membership.168 Did the Constitution actually require that? The
NLRB explained that this policy came from interpreting the NLRA’s
term “representative” in light of the NLRA’s purposes, as well as “the
national policy against discrimination” as “expressed in the Fifth
Amendment . . . and in the President’s Executive Orders.”169 While
promoting a good cause, this all represents an incoherent hash regard-
ing state action theory that, not surprisingly, fell to the wayside after
the Civil Rights Act of 1964—including, but not limited to, Title VII—
and other statutes that barred employment and certain other types of
racial discrimination by private parties.
Still, concerns about racial discrimination were central in theories
of state action in the years leading up to those antidiscrimination stat-
utes. Revealingly, Justice Douglas, author of the Hanson decision, was
generally an advocate for a broad view of state action in order to com-
bat racial discrimination. Just before Title VII was enacted, the Su-
preme Court issued a fractured set of opinions in Bell v. Maryland,170
which involved trespass convictions of civil rights activists at a segre-
gated restaurant. Bell raised the issue of whether the Constitution
barred state enforcement of discrimination in private accommoda-
tions. While the majority opinion by Justice Brennan avoided state
163. Id. at 33.
164. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 35, at 1102–03.
165. The NLRB is the agency tasked with deciding most cases of alleged violations of
the NLRA in the first instance.
166. LEE, supra note 158, at 47.
167. Id. at 45–47.
168. Id. at 54.
169. Id.
170. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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action issues, Justice Douglas, in conference and in a concurring opin-
ion, argued to the contrary. The state had licensed the restaurant,
which made it “an instrumentality of the state,” which could not run
“on the basis of apartheid.”171 In his concurrence, Douglas wrote that
the “whole Nation” must “face the issue . . . at the root of demonstra-
tions, unrest, riots, and violence in various areas.”172 While the Court
never adopted the view that the government’s licensing of businesses
makes the decisions of those businesses state action, the source of
Douglas’s concerns is revealing.
This had a real effect on state action theory. As Professor Cynthia
Estlund put it, “[T]he Supreme Court did expand the meaning of state
action in order to strike down some entrenched Jim Crow prac-
tices.”173 But, she adds, “[I]t never went far enough in its state action
jurisprudence to impose constitutional constraints on ordinary private
employers’ hiring, firing, and disciplinary practices.”174
Unions were a more difficult issue for some because they had
gained some of their power from the NLRA, as opposed to employers
who held their powers over employment from the common law.175 Yet,
on closer inspection, it should make no difference to the state action
issue whether a private employer’s power to agree to permit contract
terms comes from state common law or federal statutory law. Here,
Lee’s discussion of the parallel thread of the legal argument—conserv-
atives using broad state action to attack unions—is key.
While liberals were experimenting with broad theories of state ac-
tion in order to combat racism, some on the political right were using
similar theories specifically to attack unions. With famous movie di-
rector Cecil B. DeMille as a lead plaintiff, the post-New Deal, newly
christened right-to-work movement adopted the sort of state action ar-
guments that Steele suggested—although, Lee writes, conservatives
used the analogy between right-to-work and black civil rights to bol-
ster their anti-union movement, not to support the civil rights move-
ment. Their goal was to weaken unions.176 Their legal theory was,
explicitly, that state action exists when courts permit private entities
to harm other private entities.177
Conservatives pushed constitutional objections to union security
clauses in both the public and private sector. In the public sector, with
171. LEE, supra note 158, at 151 & n.42.
172. Bell, 378 U.S. at 243 (Douglas, J., concurring).
173. Estlund, Workplace Constitution, supra note 158, at 1147.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. LEE, supra note 158, at 56–69.
177. Id. at 77 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 15, De Mille v. Am. Fed’n of
Radio Artists, 333 U.S. 876 (1948) (No. 679)). There was never a decision in this
case that addressed the state action issue. LEE, supra note 158, at 75; see Es-
tlund, Workplace Constitution, supra note 158, at 1152.
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Abood, they succeeded in establishing a First Amendment right for
members of union bargaining units to refuse to pay dues pursuant to a
union security clause for activities not related to collective bargaining.
They would continue to make the argument that the First Amend-
ment did not allow any form of union security clause in the public sec-
tor in a series of cases, coming the closest, but not quite succeeding, in
Harris. Conservatives pushed this constitutional argument in the pri-
vate sector as well, but aside from Hanson, no court found a constitu-
tional violation. While dicta in Street arguably kept this argument
alive from the mid-1950s through the mid-1980s, likely because it was
decided as a matter of constitutional avoidance, no subsequent case
felt it necessary to squarely address the issue. In 1988, Beck was de-
cided on statutory, not constitutional, grounds. In the decades be-
tween Beck and Harris, the theory that private-sector union security
clauses constituted state action was effectively dormant.
Meanwhile, the enactment of various antidiscrimination statutes
seemed to quell the desire of liberal justices to expand state action to
try to address race discrimination by ostensibly private actors. Mod-
ern state action theory does not contain the arguably implicit special
rules for race discrimination that cases from an earlier era did. For
example, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,178 the Supreme Court found
no state action in a state’s granting of a liquor license to a private club
which discriminated on the basis of race. State action, the Court ex-
plained, is not created “if the private entity receives any sort of benefit
or service at all from the state, or it if it is subject to state regulation
in any degree whatever.”179 The state must have “significantly in-
volved itself with invidious discrimination.”180
Still, some anti-union conservatives never gave up on their argu-
ment that a broad theory of state action should apply to unions. As
Professor Estlund explains, while Beck was a partial victory for right-
to-work in that it created a substantive statutory right under the
NLRA for a dissenting member of a union bargaining unit to refuse to
pay dues that go to activities not related to collective bargaining:
[T]he ultimate goal of the right-to-work advocates—embraced by Justice
Black’s dissent in Street—was uncompromising and unchanged.  In their
view, the Constitution compels an open shop, or a right-to-work regime across
the board, and is contravened by any contractual or statutory provision re-
quiring individuals to pay a fee of any kind to a union . . . .181
Harris brought this argument back from its apparent grave. Yet,
courts have never accepted this argument. That is in large part be-
178. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
179. Id. at 173.
180. Id. Justice Douglas dissented in Moose Lodge, perhaps demonstrating that he has
long had an exceptionally broad view of what should constitute state action. Id. at
179–83.
181. Estlund, Workplace Constitution, supra note 158, at 1155.
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cause accepting it would revolutionize state action theory, making it
so broad as to be truly incoherent.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINDING THAT PRIVATE-SECTOR
UNION SECURITY AGREEMENTS CONSTITUTE
STATE ACTION
Finding that private-sector union security clauses constitute state
action would be incoherently broad theoretically and would be un-
bounded and unworkable in practice. As to theory, adopting the argu-
ment right-to-work advocates have pushed comes down to accepting a
theory that state action is present where the law merely permits a
private entity to, arguably, harm another.182 This approach would es-
sentially obliterate the meaning and, therefore, the requirement of
state action. In practice, applied in a principled manner, any theory
supporting the Harris dicta would have extraordinary and undesir-
able effects in all areas of law. Applied just to unions, this theory
would be deeply unprincipled.
A. Incoherently Broad in Theory
The theory that contracts between private parties may implicate
state action when enforced by a court is most famously associated with
Shelley v. Kraemer.183 Shelley found that a court attempting to en-
force racially restrictive covenants constituted state action sufficient
for a constitutional violation, explaining that the state was sufficiently
“entangled” in the discriminatory act. Union security clauses are ar-
guably distinguishable because, like other clauses in labor contracts,
they are enforced primarily through a system of private arbitration,
designed by the private parties to the labor contract and administered
by private arbitrators, and are not usually enforced by courts or gov-
ernment agencies.184 But, more importantly, courts have at best lim-
ited Shelley to its facts because of its potential extraordinary
breadth.185 For example, in Evans v. Abney,186 the Supreme Court
182. Id. at 1153–53 (correctly characterizing the right-to-work argument in this fash-
ion and pointing out some of the radical implications, including reversing the
traditional “at will” employment rule).
183. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
184. See, e.g., HARRIS ET AL., supra note 35, at 1033–87. It is true that if parties refuse
to abide by the arbitrator’s decision, an objecting party may seek court enforce-
ment. But the standard of review courts use in labor arbitrations is so deferential
that this rarely, in fact, happens. It is also true that an employee could, in theory,
file a type of DFR claim that the NLRB or court could hear if the employee
claimed that a certain contract clause was actually illegal, but this too is uncom-
mon. The standard way in which labor contracts are enforced is through private
arbitrators. Id.
185. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. Shelley v. Kraemer “has proven to
be a very difficult case to rationalize.” Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer
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found no unconstitutional state action even though Evans also in-
volved court enforcement of racially based property restrictions.187
Professor Rosen adds that “[c]ourts routinely enforce contracts whose
substantive provisions could not have been constitutionally enacted by
government,”188 for example, settlement agreements that limit a
party’s ability to speak publicly about the settlement.
Of course, legal theorists of the past and present have argued that
the public/private distinction at its very core was incoherent in princi-
ple.189 In this tradition, Professor Mark Tushnet has suggested that
the “background rules” of state common law doctrines of property, con-
tract, and tort are a form of public regulation.190 This Article is not
meant to suggest that the critiques of the very concept of a public/
private distinction, or arguments that state action literally always ex-
ists,191 do not have at least some provocative force. Courts, however,
have not come remotely close to adopting this approach, and it seems
highly unlikely that the justices in the Harris majority, or other Su-
preme Court justices, intended to. To do so would profoundly trans-
form private law.
In general, conservative Justices have favored narrower construc-
tions of state action.192 It is understandable that the conservative liti-
gants in Beck and related cases would advocate a theory of state
action broad enough to essentially make the state action requirement
meaningless; their goal was and is to make all union security clauses
unconstitutional, and they could choose to ignore the implications of
their theories in other contexts. But, any principled application of the
Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451, 453 (2007). Profes-
sor Peretti labels Shelley “anomalous” and quotes Professor Michael Klarman
that “Shelley would have been a ‘truly revolutionary’ decision, had subsequent
decisions taken it seriously, which they never did.” Peretti, supra note 44, at 281.
186. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
187. Peretti, supra note 44, at 278. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), also
involved private enforcement of a private contract, and even though there was
some involvement of a state actor, the court found no state action.
188. Evans, 396 U.S. at 453–54.
189. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
190. See Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and the National Political Order: Collabo-
ration and Confrontation, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DE-
VELOPMENT (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
191. Cass R. Sunstein, State Action is Always Present, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 465 (2002); see
also Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court 1966 Term: Foreword: “State Ac-
tion,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95
(1967) (arguing that state action is “a conceptual disaster area.”).
192. While the story of the narrowing of the state action doctrine is more complex than
simply liberal judges expanding the doctrine and conservative judges limiting it,
this ideological division is, as Professor Peretti put it, “certainly part of the story.”
Peretti, supra note 44, at 274.
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suggestions in Harris by courts would have sweepingly unbounded
and undesirable effects.
B. Unbounded and Unworkable in Practice
Deciding that private-sector labor contracts are a product of state
action would have extreme and troubling practical consequences, in-
cluding, but not limited to, union security clauses and labor law gener-
ally. To start with labor law, this approach would do at least the
following. First, it would make all union security clauses in the pri-
vate sector, as well as the public sector, unconstitutional. While that is
not the rule the Court has worked out for the public-sector under the
First Amendment per Abood nor is it the rule this author would en-
dorse for situations in which state action is present,193 Harris and
Friedrichs indicated that there are at least four votes on the current
Supreme Court to reverse Abood and hold that the First Amendment
does not permit any type of union security clause. As shown above, the
Harris majority severely criticized Abood and the idea that union se-
curity clauses of any kind were constitutional; it only avoided over-
turning Abood because, the Harris majority found, the workers at
issue were merely “quasi-public,” not fully public, employees.
Friedrichs, however, unambiguously involved fully public employees
(public school teachers in California), and the Court, even without
Justice Scalia, still had four votes against upholding the lower court
decision that had simply applied Abood. Thus, Friedrichs indicates
that there are at least four justices currently on the Supreme Court
who believe that where state action exists, the First Amendment bars
any sort of union security clause.194 And again, dicta in Harris seems
to indicate that at least four current justices may be willing to apply
that constitutional analysis to the private sector. Mandating right-to-
work rules in the private sector would have a crushing effect on
unions.195
193. See, e.g., Estlund, Unions, supra note 120, at 215–20 (arguing that even where
the First Amendment applies, union security clauses are not a constitutional
violation).
194. See Charlotte Garden, Friedrichs v. California Teachers’ Association & Why We
Need Nine, AM. CONST. SOC’Y: ACSBLOG (March 30, 2016), https://www.acslaw
.org/acsblog/friedrichs-v-california-teachers-association-why-we-need-nine
[https://perma.unl.edu/YF8Q-ZLSP].
195. This is true in part because right-to-work rules combined with DFR rules create a
major “free rider” problem for unions. In right-to-work jurisdictions, members of
a union bargaining unit may not be required to pay any dues, and thus may not
be required to pay any of the costs the union incurs representing them. On the
other hand, it is black-letter DFR law that unions may not refuse to represent
members of their bargaining units, e.g., in contract negotiations or in grievance
and arbitration procedures, because they refuse to pay dues. See HARRIS ET AL.,
supra note 35, at 1129–30.
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Second, this approach would seem to require that all clauses in
private-sector union contracts would be a product of state action. How
could other clauses be distinguished? Surely not through Hanson’s
suggestion that the RLA preempting state laws which barred union
security clauses creates state action. Because, as shown above, federal
labor laws preempt state statutes both specifically and generally. The
NLRA preempts state laws that purport to limit or expand employee
rights under section 7 of the NLRA, including, but not limited to, the
right to bargain collectively.196 Alternatively, labor laws use the ex-
clusive-representative model for negotiating all terms of labor con-
tracts, not just union security clauses. Yet, no court has ever
suggested that, for example, a private-sector labor contract clause that
allowed drug testing is subject to the Fourth Amendment restrictions,
as such clauses are in the public sector under the Constitution.197
Would Fifth Amendment protections apply to private-sector contract
clauses covering discipline if the employer was investigating poten-
tially criminal activity, as they do in public-sector labor contracts?198
Would contractual disciplinary procedures, including grievance and
arbitration clauses, in the private sector have to comply with constitu-
tional due process rules?199 Again, no court has ever suggested this,
but this would be the logical extension of the arguments that union
security clauses in the private sector constitute state action.
Indeed, finding state action in other private-sector labor contract
provisions would not only be inconsistent with current practice, it
would also be inconsistent with at least one significant Supreme Court
decision that Beck cited favorably. As noted above, the Beck majority
made a point of observing that Steelworkers v. Weber200 had held that
an affirmative action clause in a private-sector labor contract did not
implicate state action.
Moreover, the implications would go far beyond union contracts or
even employment contracts. Under Hanson’s reasoning, if the NLRA
creates state action, then why wouldn’t the Federal Arbitration Act
196. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236 (1959).
197. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment places certain limits on drug testing in public employ-
ment; e.g., employees whose work does not implicate special safety concerns may
not be tested without reasonable, individualized suspicion).
198. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (holding that public employees
have certain Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination in employer in-
vestigations into alleged workplace misdeeds that would also be crimes).
199. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (setting out due
process requirements for public employees with a property interest in public em-
ployment). Note that under Loudermill, private-sector union employees would al-
most always have a propriety interest in public employment through the
standard “just cause” discipline requirements in union contracts.
200. 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979).
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(FAA)?201 The FAA goes further than the NLRA and RLA in that the
FAA permits employment and other contracts that would not be legal
absent the federal statute, as well as preempts state laws that purport
to bar such agreements. Circuit City Stores v. Adams202 upheld the
right of employers under the FAA to require employees, as a condition
of employment, to arbitrate any employment law dispute, as opposed
to litigating in court. Furthermore, it held that the FAA preempts any
state law attempting to bar such agreements, which some did. Subse-
quently, the Supreme Court has held that, under the FAA, individual
agreements to arbitrate may legally bar class actions, preempting any
state law making that term illegal.203
The FAA, of course, also governs arbitration agreements outside
the employment context, such as in commercial purchases. No case
has suggested that arbitration agreements authorized by the FAA in
private employment or in private commercial transactions constitute
state action that implicates the Constitution, yet under the reasoning
of Hanson, they should.
Beyond this, if applied in a principled manner, the theories used to
argue that private-sector union security clauses constitute state ac-
tion—that federal contract law preempts private contract law, that
federal contract law authorizes a type of collective entity and permits
it to form voluntary contracts that are binding, or both—would have
too many obvious and bizarre consequences to list. At minimum, all
actions taken by any and all previously private collective entities au-
thorized by law, be it a union or corporation, would constitute state
action.
IV. CONCLUSION: A BETTER APPROACH TO STATE ACTION
Were the justices in Harris to follow up on their surprisingly
strong suggestion that private-sector union security clauses implicate
the First Amendment, it would create an incoherently broad and prac-
tically problematic theory of state action. The Court should clarify
that it is not going down this path and explain why. The following
briefly summarizes the basic principles that should govern in this
area.
If a law literally requires any particular employer and group of em-
ployees to be subject to a union security clause, that would likely be
state action. In part, that is why public-sector contracts involve state
action: the government employer is, through being a party to the con-
tract, requiring certain terms in the text of a contract.
201. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
202. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
203. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
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If a law specifically requires parties to pay dues to a union, or other
institution, as a condition of practicing any particular profession, and
that profession was otherwise highly regulated and constrained by the
state, that could constitute state action. This is essentially Keller
without the confusing dicta about unions.
If, however, the law merely authorizes parties to enter into con-
tracts generally, and it does not dictate or require terms, that is not
state action. It does not become state action merely because the law
authorizes the creation of certain collective entities that may take part
in the negotiations and bind participants in the organization, be they
private business organizations or unions. It does not become state ac-
tion because the relevant law is federal law that preempts state law in
the area. And, it does not become state action merely because deeming
it so could allow judges to impose their policy preferences, about un-
ions or other matters, as a matter of constitutional law.
